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Abstract
Administrative action is steadily growing in Ethiopia, the major part of which 
is administrative rulemaking. It ranges from regulation of the major industries 
to the provision of basic commodities like sugar and edible oil. Modern states 
cannot effectively function without allowing the administrative agencies to 
have such roles, subject to the caveat that the agencies should to be kept in 
check by procedural stipulations and schemes. In this regard, there is gap in the 
Ethiopian legal regime due to the absence of administrative procedure law. This 
is a neglected subject both by the legal academia and practitioners. This article 
highlights the problems associated with the gaps in administrative law in 
Ethiopia and we argue that the prompt adoption of the Draft Federal 
Administrative Procedure Proclamation (2004) is necessary. The meaning of 
and the theoretical issues in relation to administrative legislation are discussed 
followed by the basic procedures and principles that should harness discretion 
and abuse of authority.
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Introduction
Ethiopia has pledged to have a government limited by law, i.e. the principle of 
constitutionalism first through the 1991 Transitional Period Charter and then the 
1995 Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. This 
inevitably envisages certain standards of government. One of the areas of 
executive action that needs schemes of checks and balance is rulemaking or 
administrative legislation, which owing to various theoretical and practical 
reasons, allows the executive to make rules of general application.
Good governance presupposes universally accepted minimum procedures of 
administrative rule making. The absence of general administrative rulemaking
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procedures in Ethiopia is indeed a striking scenario in the Ethiopian executive 
working environment. Another way of placing a controlling scheme on the 
exercise of power by the executive is institutional control by the parliament and 
courts as part of separation of powers. Moreover some watchdog institutions 
like human rights commissions and the Ombudsman institutions could also have 
a role.
The aim of this article is to highlight the problem associated with the absence 
of adequate normative rules in the Ethiopian legal system and the gap in 
institutional setup. To this end, the article starts with an introductory discussion 
on the functions of administrative law and highlights some of the theoretical 
objections to administrative rulemaking. The article further deals with some 
fundamental principles and procedures of administrative rulemaking and the 
controlling mechanisms that serve as background to the discussion of the 
Ethiopian case. Moreover, discussion is made on the expedience of legislation 
on general administrative procedures.
1. Definition and Functions of Administrative Law and 
Administrative Rulemaking: An Overview
There is variation in the definition of administrative law and administrative 
rulemaking. As the following brief discussion (on the core features of 
administrative law and administrative rulemaking) indicates, this is mostly 
attributable to the variation among legal systems as to what they consider to be 
within the realm of administrative law.
1.1 Administrative Law
Some British jurists define administrative law narrowly while others use broad 
definitions.1 Dicey observes that administrative law was unknown to British
1 For instance, Robson defined administrative law as the law of public administration; 
see Robson, quoted in Upadhyaya, J.J.R., (2006), Administrative law, 6th ed., (Central 
Law Agency, Allahabad, India) p. 2. Robson’s definition seems to be circular that 
may have a negative impact on the clear understanding of the concept and nature of 
the subject. Administrative law should be regarded as the law relating to public 
administration, in the same way as commercial law consists of the law relating to 
commerce, or as land law is related to land. Dr. Port, in 1929, defined Administrative 
law as a branch of public law, which is made up of all those legal rules either formally 
expressed by statutes or implied in the prerogative-which have as their ultimate object 
the fulfillment of public law. According to Sir Ivor Jennings, Administrative law is the 
law relating to Administration. Neither Port nor Jennings defined Administrative law 
properly as the former described it and the later put it in a very general manner. See 
Jennings, (1959), Law and the Constitution quoted in Upadhyaya, J.J.R., (2006). 
Others like Albert Dicey understood it in a very narrow manner denoting only the 
portion of a nation’s legal system which determines the legal status and liabilities of
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judges and counsel.2 In England, the system of administrative law and the very 
principles on which it rests were unknown until recently.3 This, however, does 
not mean that administrative law and its components are completely alien to 
England because the British parliament and the courts have always been and still 
are active in controlling the functions of administrative authorities. 4
American scholars define administrative law within the context of their legal 
and justice system.5 Their conception of administrative law usually focuses on 
administrative rulemaking and the rule adjudicating aspects of administrative 
actions. Moreover, the American approach in defining administrative law 
emphasizes on one method of control; i.e. judicial control by seemingly 
undermining the control function of other organs.
in spite of such variation in perspectives, there are core functions that 
constitute the essential features of administrative law. Primarily, it has a control
all state officials. He regarded administrative law as the rights and liabilities of private 
individuals in their dealings with public officials and as a law that specifies the 
procedure by which those rights and liabilities are enforced; see Dicey, A.V., (1959), 
An introduction to the study of the law of the constitution, 10th ed., (Universal Law 
Publishing Co. PVT. Ltd, Delhi, India) pp. 328-405. Dicey’s formulation is based on 
the French Droit Administratif and, obviously disregards entities outside government 
agencies and authorities such as public corporations and public enterprises which 
under the Ethiopian legal system have their own legal personality and legal and 
institutional framework to be governed by. Ethiopian administrative laws do not 
regulate these enterprises. Moreover, Dicey’s definition excludes how the 
administrative authorities are going to be controlled by other institutions like the 
legislative, the judiciary, the Ombudsman and the remedies/solutions for entities that 
might be aggrieved by the activities of these administrative authorities.
2 Dicey, A.V., supra note 1, p. 330.
3 Ibid.
4 Fasil Abebe, “Notes on Administrative Law: French and English Experience”, Mizan 
Law Review, Vol. 4 No. 1, March, 2010, pp. 160. See also Leyland, P., and Woods, 
T., (2002), Text Book on Administrative law, 4th ed., (Oxford University Press, Delhi, 
India) p. 554, and Wade, H.W.R., and Forsyth, C.F. (2004), Administrative Law, 9th 
ed., (Oxford University Press, Delhi, India), p. 9.
5 K.C. Davis, for instance, defined administrative law as the law concerning the powers 
and procedures of administrative agencies, including especially the law governing 
judicial review of administrative action. See Davis, K.C quoted in Jayakumar, N.K., 
(2005), Administrative Law, (Central Law Agency, Allahabad, India) p. 5. 
Administrative law, in USA, is a law that governs the judicial control of administrative 
activities and procedures. In this regard, Davis’s approach seems to be proper as it 
puts emphasis on procedures followed by administrative agencies in exercising their 
powers. This is not, however, to discount the role of the US Congress in directly or 
indirectly controlling administrative action through the power of the purse (budgeting) 
and others.
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function, acting as a brake or check in respect of the unlawful exercise or abuse 
of governmental/administrative power; it can also have a command function by 
making public bodies perform their statutory duties, including the exercise of 
discretion under a statute. Secondly, it has a facilitative function because it 
embodies principles that facilitate good practices in administrative functions 
toward ensuring that the rules of natural justice or fairness are adhered to. 
Administrative law provides for accountability and transparency, including 
participation by interested persons and parties in the process of government, and 
it provides a remedy for grievances occasioned at the hands of public authorities.
In Britain, administrative cases and matters used to be addressed in one 
basket with constitutional disputes/cases. There is no separate court/tribunal 
system and all matters were adjudicated by the regular/ordinary courts of the 
land. In the United States, much emphasis is given to the control of 
administrative actions only by one external organ; i.e. the judiciary, and more 
focus is given to procedural issues.6 Be this as it may, the understanding that 
guides the discussion in this article is that administrative law is a system of 
procedural rules and principles that regulates and guides the exercise of power 
by the executive organ of the state. More specifically, it deals with the 
regulation of the delegated rulemaking and adjudicative functions performed by 
executive organs.
1.2 Administrative Rulemaking
The American Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946 states that “rule 
means the whole or part of an agency statement of general or particular 
applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret or prescribe law 
or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of 
an agency ...”.7 From this statutory definition, one can easily understand that 
rules are different from laws and policies. A rule is made for the purpose of 
implementing, interpreting, and prescribing laws and policies.
The Draft Federal Administrative Procedure Proclamation (hereinafter the 
Draft Proclamation) prepared by the Justice and Legal System Research 
Institute (JLSRI) in 2004 (1996 E.C) defines rules in a very similar manner with 
that of the APA. Article 2 (4)(10) of the Draft Proclamation defines ‘rule’ as a 
delegated legislation issued by an agency8 including the mode of operation of
6 For an excellent discussion on American administrative law and procedure, see Peter 
L. Strauss (2002), Administrative Justice in the United States, 2nd ed., Carolina 
Academic Press, North Carolina, USA.
7 The American Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946.
8 The same draft instrument defined agency under Art. 2(2)(2) as an administrative 
agency with regulatory/supervisory power/function of the federal executive and a 
service rendering public office.
Administrative Rulemaking in Ethiopia: Normative and Institutional Framework 5
the agency or the whole or a part of an agency statement of general applicability 
that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy, or the organization, 
procedure or practice requirements of an agency. The term includes the 
amendment, repeal or suspension of an existing rule. in the words of oliver 
Wendell Holmes, “rule is the skin of a living policy that hardens an inchoate 
normative judgment into the frozen forms of words”.9 Administrative 
rulemaking is, thus, the process/procedure involved in the making of 
administrative rules by administrative agencies in particular and of the executive 
branch of the government in general.
Characterizing a certain administrative act as an act of rulemaking has a 
number of implications, chief among them being the need to follow the 
procedures prescribed by law. Administrative laws (in the form of a code or 
scattered rules and principles) place a procedural requirement in exercising a 
given task; and in the event of non-compliance to the prescribed procedures, the 
specific decision of the agency would be void or contestable as the case may be.
Administrative rules are made by the executive under the powers delegated 
to it by the legislature. When the function of legislation is entrusted to organs 
other than the legislature itself, the legislation made by such organs is called 
delegated legislation.10 Therefore, as will be discussed later, administrative rules 
or delegated legislation do not fall within the ambit of the inherent constitutional 
powers/functions of administrative agencies as they are created only to execute 
the laws made by the proper lawmaking body. The power of making 
administrative rules is entrusted in administrative agencies by way of delegation 
from the lawmaking organ of the government.
The legislature delegates some of its lawmaking power to the executive 
organ due to various reasons such as parliamentary time, expertise/technicality 
of administrative matters, reason of secrecy, flexibility of administrative 
rulemaking procedure and emergency. it is analogous to an agency-principal 
relationship in which the principal authorizes the agent to perform some acts in 
his/her/ its behalf and for the exclusive interest of the same. The role of 
administrative agencies in any system of government is thus to bring down all 
the policies and general laws onto the ground and give them life. In spite of its 
importance and role, however, there is critique against the concept of 
administrative rules, as highlighted in the following section.
9 Cornelius M. K., (1997), Rule Making, How Government Agencies Write Law and 
Make Policy, (Universal Book Traders, Delhi, India), p. 3.
10 Upadhyaya, J.J.R., supra note 1, p. 59.
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2. An Overview of the Criticism against Administrative 
Legislation
The realists consider administrative law as a law, while it may not be so for the 
positivists to whom law is strictly the one which is enacted by the legislative 
organ of the government as in the cases of contract law, criminal law, family 
law, or commercial law. As administrative law is not promulgated by the proper 
lawmaking body but by way of delegation, positivists like John Austin argue 
that “laws properly so called” must be distinguished from morals and other 
laws11 which, he described as “laws improperly” so called that lack force or 
sanction of the state.12
According to the classical and pure theory of separation of powers, each 
government unit must stick to the function/power entrusted to it. One organ 
must not interfere in the function of the other. The legislative wing of the 
government is empowered to make laws, which will be enforced by the 
executive and interpreted by the judiciary. Other than these, neither the 
executive nor the judiciary are allowed to perform tasks given to the legislative 
by a constitution, and if either of the two does so, then they will violate the 
constitution and the act will be declared invalid.
The British constitutional law jurist Albert V. Dicey, strongly criticized the 
French system of droit Administratif as it is against two important aspects of 
rule of law, which is one of the most significant constitutional principles; i.e. 
absolute supremacy/predominance of regular laws (as opposed to arbitrariness 
and discretion) and equality before the law.13 Dicey stated that rule of law 
means the absolute supremacy or predominance of the regular law as opposed to 
the influence of arbitrary power and excludes the existence of arbitrariness, of 
prerogative, or even wide discretionary authority on the part of the government. 
The other aspect of rule of law, for Dicey, is equality before the law.14 By this, 
he meant, equal subjection of all classes of citizens to the ordinary/regular law 
of the land administered by the ordinary/regular courts.15
11 The words other laws’”, referred to administrative laws made outside the proper 
law making body.
12 John Austin (1883), ‘The Province of Jurisprudence Determined” in Paranjape, N.V., 
(2001), Studies in Jurisprudence and Legal Theory, 3rd ed., (Central Law Agency, 
Allahabad, India), p. 2.
13 Dicey, A.V., supra note 1, p. 353. see also Jayakumar, N.K., supra note 1, pp. 5-6
14 Ibid.
15 Laws made by the proper lawmaking body designated by the constitution like the 
parliament in England or the National Assembly in France or HoPR in Ethiopia.
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France has a separate rule and statute of administrative law and procedure 
and a separately organized and structured institution; i.e. the Conseil d’Etat16 
which, for Dicey, is against the principle of equality before the law as such a 
system creates differences that some classes of the citizens are going to be 
governed by a different law interpreted by a separately instituted tribunal. “If 
this is not against the equality aspect of rule of law, then what is?” asks Dicey.
Nonetheless, administrative rules and procedures have supporters because the 
contemporary concept of state is different from that of the former centuries 
when the function of the state was limited to four areas, namely maintaining 
peace and order, levying and collecting taxes, defending the sovereign nation 
from external invasion and administration of justice.17 The laissez-faire doctrine 
emphasized only on individual enterprise and limited the function of the state as 
much as possible. it considered the state as a facilitator and it gave much focus 
to the free enterprise of individuals, maximum contractual freedom and market 
forces that must determine the structure and flow of the socio-economic life of 
the nation.18
This type of state proposed by the apostles of this doctrine in the late 17th and 
18th C., only had a facilitative role and was known as the ‘Law and Order 
State’.19 However, such a limited role of the state in the socio-economic system 
and the concept of free enterprise and industrialization generated many 
problems, which were not foreseen by the adherents of the laissez-faire 
philosophy. The concentration of population in the cities, lack of proper 
facilities for accommodation for such population, unhealthy and dangerous 
conditions of work, and others were factors which necessitated relatively wider 
state involvement. These new developments thus paved the way for the decline 
of the laissez-faire theory. As Griffith and Street duly observed, “the very 
success of laissez-faire was its undoing”.20
The failure of laissez-faire led to rethinking the role of the state in the socio­
economic life of the nation. it was realized that the activities of the state should 
not be confined to the traditional functions, but should expand to meet the new 16 17 18 19 20
16 Literally, it means Council of State. It is empowered to adjudicate and resolve 
administrative litigations and disputes in France, see Freedman, C.E., (1961), The 
Conseil D’etat in Modern France, and Ducamin, B., (1981) Role of the Conseil 
D ’etat in Drafting Legislation, ICLQ, Vol. 30.
17 Jayakumar, N.K., supra note 1, p. 2. See also Leyland, P., and Woods, T., supra note 
1, pp. 5 and Scott & Felix, (1997), Principles of Administrative Law, (Cavendish 
Publishing Limited, UK) p. 28.
18 Jayakumar, N.K., supra note 1, p. 2.
19 Ibid.
20 Griffith & Street in Jayakumar, N.K., supra note 1, p. 2.
challenges.21 The popularity of humanitarian and socialist ideas accelerated the 
demand for state action in the field of social security. The state was also 
compelled to undertake planning and regulatory measures in the public 
interest.22 As a result of the extension of franchise, the working classes became 
active participants in the political process, compelling the state to initiate as 
many welfare measures as possible.23
Freidman notes that the state began to function as protector and dispenser of 
social services, industrial manager, economic controller and arbiter.24 In other 
words, the state assumed a positive role and the concept of the social welfare 
state replaced the police state. As a result, there was a phenomenal increase in 
the area of state operation, and the activities of the state extended to all aspects 
of human life.25 The inevitable result of these changes was an increase in the 
powers and functions of the state. This was reflected in the three organs of the 
government, but the executive organ that was functionally the most suited to 
shoulder the major part of the new responsibilities, assumed a vital role in this 
process of transformation.
Nevertheless, there seems to be a different view which states that 
functionally, the executive was not a particularly apt repository for such new 
powers. This assumption, however, only envisages three organs of the state: 
legislative, judicial and executive, and the functions that overflow from the first 
two could only go to the third.26
Many functions, which were traditionally supposed to be within the domain 
of the legislature and the judiciary, came to be exercised by the executive. Such 
functions include the enactment of new laws that cannot be handled by the 
regular legislative body due to lack of time and expertise (technicality of the 
subject matter). Administrative agencies thus became the converging point of all 
types of government functions, including rulemaking. Stone calls this 
concentration of powers in the executive branch of the government; “the 20th 
century administrative explosion,”27 and Robson named it “the hegemony of the 
executive”.28
8_______________ Mizan Law Review______________ Vol. 7 No.1, September 2013
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Jayakumar, N.K., supra note 1, p. 2.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Freidman, (1970), Law in a Changing Society, (Oxford University Press, UK) p. 378. 
See also Foulkes, David, in Jayakumar, N.K., supra note 1, p. 2.
Jayakumar, N.K., supra note 1, p. 2.
Julius Stone, (1966), Social Dimension of Law and Justice, in Upadhyaya, J.J.R., 
supra note 1, p. 8.
Id, p. 696
Robson quoted in Upadhyaya, J.J.R., supra note 1, p. 59.
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3. Principles of Administrative Legislation
As has been discussed earlier, administrative rules/delegated legislation are 
made outside the proper lawmaking body; i.e. the legislative organ of the 
government. unlike the ordinary laws or parliamentary enactments, they may 
not be required to meet the requirements of legislative procedures. This may 
have the tendency of paving the way for uncontrolled administrative discretion/ 
arbitrariness thereby jeopardizing individual rights and the constitutional order 
as a whole.
According to Hewart, unless the powers of the state are exercised according 
to law, it will ultimately lead to administrative despotism.29 In the long run, 
arbitrary power becomes despotism if the so-called administrative ‘law’ 
essentially amounts to lawlessness, when it is greatly extended; and this leads to 
the loss of those hardly won liberties, which it has taken centuries to establish.30 
For this reason, certain principles have been developed and put in practice so 
that administrative rules may not encroach upon individual rights and freedoms. 
These schemes of protection and control against discretion and abuse are the 
principles of notice, public participation, publication, and control (in the forms 
of legislative control, judicial review and the ombudsman).
3.1 Notice
Notice is the first and one of the most important principles of administrative 
rulemaking. From the point of view of citizens affected, the primary safeguard 
to ensure the proper exercise of powers of administrative rules/delegated 
legislations lies in the development of adequate procedures to be followed by 
the administrative process in the formulation of rules and procedures as a means 
of obtaining participation in the process of making the administrative rules, and 
one of these means is notice. In some jurisdictions, it is known as Antecedent 
Publicity.31
For instance in India, there is no separate law relating to the system of 
antecedent publicity; however, in certain cases the various enabling statutes 
have provided for it. To this end, it is required that the administrative rules must 
be first published in a draft form to give an opportunity to the people to have 
their say in the rulemaking.32 Under such system, the authority must, first, 
publish a draft of the proposed administrative rules in the Gazette, secondly, the
29
30
Lord Hewart quoted in Upadhyaya, J.J.R., supra note 1, p. 59.
Ibid.
31 Upadhyaya, J.J.R., supra note 1, pp. 108. See also the Amharic expose de motif 
(explanatory note) prepared by the drafters of the Draft Federal Administrative 
procedure code of Ethiopia p. 5.
32 ibid.
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authority must invite objections and suggestions by a specific date, and third, the 
authority must take into consideration any objections and suggestions, which 
may be received by it while finalizing the rules.33
in the US, there is widespread use of the technique of antecedent publicity. 
Section 4 of the American Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 requires 
general notice of the proposed rule/s to be published in the federal register. The 
agency concerned must then provide the opportunity for the participation of 
interested persons through submission of written data, views and arguments 
with or without opportunity to present the same orally in any manner.34
in England, the system was provided for under the Britain Rules of 
Publication Act of 1893. Under Section 1 of this Act, public notice of proposals 
to make statutory rules was given, and the department concerned has to consider 
suggestions made by interested bodies, which were thus made aware of the 
proposed rules of which they otherwise might not have known.35 At present, 
however, Britain’s new Statutory Instrument Act of 1946 that replaces the 
previous one, does not require antecedent publicity as a test of validity of an 
administrative rule though sometimes, especially, in individual cases, parliament 
may provide for antecedent publicity.36
Coming to the Ethiopian case, the Draft Federal Administrative Procedure 
Proclamation clearly obliges the administrative agencies to cause notice of their 
contemplated actions to be publicized in the newspaper or other means of Mass 
Media prior to the adoption of administrative rules.37 The draft proclamation 
also specifies the detailed content of the notice which shall include:
a) an explanation of the basis, purpose and rationale of the proposed rule,
b) the specific legal authority authorizing the proposed rule,
c) the text of the proposed rule,
d) where, when and how persons may demand an oral proceeding on the 
proposed rule, and
e) The location and availability of the rule making record.38
33 Id, p. 107.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Chapter II, Art. 7 of the Draft Federal Administrative Procedure Proclamation of 
2004 (1996 E.C).
38 A rule making record is a document containing the full text of the rule that the agency 
made. The agency is legally obliged to maintain such an official document for each 
rule it proposes by publication in a newspaper and adopts. See art. 7(1)-(6) and Art. 
14 of the Draft Proclamation.
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Unfortunately, however, this draft legislation on administrative rulemaking 
procedures, is not yet enacted as law and does not have a binding effect. No 
administrative agency in Ethiopia thus seems to bother about the pursuance of 
such procedures of notice to ensure the constitutional validity of its actions 
while making rules and directives.
3.2 Public Participation
An important scheme of check and control in the exercise of the power of 
delegated legislation/administrative rules is consultation through which entities 
that are likely to be affected may participate in the rulemaking process. This 
system makes administrative rulemaking a democratic process and therefore 
increases its acceptability and validity.39 Such public participation in the 
rulemaking process is a valuable safeguard as it enables the interests affected to 
make their views known to the rulemaking authority.
wade and philips rightly observed that one way of avoiding a clash between 
the department exercising delegated legislative power and the interest most 
likely to be affected is to provide for some form of consultation.40 As there is 
public participation, the technique of consultation is characterized as the 
democratization of rulemaking process41 and the rationale behind this technique 
is that legislation is primarily the function of the legislative wing of the 
government where various interests are represented. But if the rulemaking is 
done by an organ other than the legislative, there must at least be a provision for 
the affected interests to present their point of view to the concerned rulemaking 
authority, and definitely, this can be one of the means which, to some extent, 
can minimize the objection to bureaucratic and prevent an improper use of rule 
making power.42
in England, although there is no statutory provision which requires public 
participation and consultation of interests before the issuance of subordinate 
legislation, it is considered mandatory and no minister in his senses with the fear 
of parliament before his eyes would think of making regulations without giving 
persons who will be affected thereby or their representatives an opportunity of 
saying what they think about the proposal.43
39 Upadhyaya, J.J.R., supra note 1, pp. 111. See also Craig, P.P., (2003), Administrative 
Law, 5th Ed, p. 403.
40 Wade and Philips quoted in Upadhyaya, J.J.R., supra note 1, p. 111.
41 Upadhyaya, J.J.R., supra note 1, p. 111.
42 Jain and Jain, Principles of Administrative Law cited in Upadhyaya, J.J.R., supra note
1, p. 111.
43 Griffith and Street, supra note 20, p. 56.
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In the US, the technique of consultation of interests (public participation) is 
very much in common use. Under the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 
there are detailed provisions for consultation requiring that interested persons 
should be given an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking process.44 In 
certain cases, Congress has made provisions for formal hearings and there is a 
general requirement of pre-publication of rules.45 Under such a system, parties 
likely to be affected are given an opportunity by the rulemaking authority to 
participate in the rulemaking process and the authority will consider the written 
data, views and arguments of those persons and finalize the rules.46 From this, 
one can simply understand that hearings preliminary to administrative 
rulemaking have become integral part of the American administrative process.
In India, there is no general statutory provision requiring prior consultation 
with the affected interests before making delegated legislation.47 While informal 
consultation is practised, certain statutes specifically provide for consultation 
and any person who is affected by an administrative directive of executive 
regulation can make suggestions or file objections.48 * Such suggestions or 
objections will be considered by the rulemaking authority. There are four major 
types of consultation of interests under the Indian system of administrative 
rulemaking; these are:- official consultation, consultation with statutory boards, 
consultation with advisory boards, and making of draft rules by affected 
interests.
Consultation of interests through public participation can thus be a statutory 
safeguard against the improper use of rulemaking power in delegated legislation 
as it infuses democratic norms. This is indeed an administrative necessity 
because effective and meaningful administration is impossible without 
imaginative administrative processes.
3.3 Publication (The Inner Morality of Law)
Another equally established principle is the entitlement of the public to have 
access to the law and to an opportunity to know the law. It has been said that 
“all laws ought either to be known or at least laid open to the knowledge of all
44
45
46
47
48
49
William Wade, (1988), Administrative Law (Oxford University Press), p. 884.
Upadhyaya, J.J.R., supra note 1, p. 112.
Ibid.
Id, p. 113.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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the world in such a manner that no one may in impunity offend against them 
under pretence of ignorance”.50
As Lon Fuller observes, people cannot be expected to comply with rules of 
which they are unaware.51 Fuller strongly argues that any genuine system of law 
necessarily abides by certain moral principles which are called “The Inner 
Morality of the Law”.52 A government can control and regulate the conduct of 
those in society in different ways. According to Fuller, a system of regulation 
and control is not a system of law, unless these principles of inner morality of 
law are satisfied.
These principles make up the inner morality of law, and are built upon the 
basic notion that law is something intended to regulate and control conduct by 
means of general rules that are addressed to humans as agents capable of 
deliberation and choice.53 Modes of regulation and control that do not rely on 
general rules or that bypass the human capacity for deliberation and choice are 
excluded and accordingly, legal rules must be applied prospectively, must be 
relatively clear in meaning and possible to comply with.54
Looking at the international experience, there is no unanimity regarding the 
mode of publication of administrative rules as a requirement in the 
administrative process. For instance, in England and the US, delegated 
legislation/administrative rules and directives are required to be published so as 
to enable the people to get knowledge about it.55 in india, the practice of 
publication of delegated legislation/administrative rules differs between statutes. 
Certain statutes require the rules to be published in the official gazette’, while 
other statutes allow the relevant administrative authority to choose its mode of 
publication.56 In the practices of the three countries above, the mode, content 
and methods of publication are different. Nevertheless, the fact that any 
administrative rule or directive should be published and made known to the 
public is an important administrative procedure they all share in common.
50 Bangndu Ganguly (1968), Administrative Legislation in Modern India (S.C. Sarkar), 
p. 74.
51 Lon L. Fuller, (1969), The Morality of Law quoted in Ian McLeod, (2007), Legal 
Theory, 4th ed., Palgrave Macmillan, New York, USA) p. 107.
52 Ibid, See also Altman, Andrew, (2001), Arguing about law, An introduction to Legal 
Philosophy, 2nd ed. (Wadsworth Publishing Company, Stanford, USA) p. 54.
53 Id. p. 55.
54 Ibid.
55 Griffith and Street, supra note 20, p. 57.
56 Upadhyaya, J.J.R., supra note 1, p. 109.
4. Controlling Mechanisms of Administrative Rulemaking
4.1 Parliamentary (Legislative) Control
As highlighted above, administrative rulemaking activities are exercised by the 
executive unit of the government and such task is not within the natural power 
of the unit; rather it has been given to it by the legislative. Such delegated power 
entails a legislative oversight by the delegator which basically arises from two 
sources. The first justification is that the one that delegates should control the 
organ (that is delegated) as to how the latter is functioning, and the scope of the 
delegated power.
Secondly, parliamentary systems of government like Ethiopia and the UK 
usually put these entities (the parliaments) at the apex of power with the highest 
political authority of the state. This gives them the power to control and 
supervise all the remaining organs accountable to them. As Jain and Jain rightly 
pointed out:
... it is the function of the legislature to legislate. if it seeks to give this 
power to the executive in some circumstances, it is not only the right of the 
legislature but also its duty. as a principal. to see how its agent carries out 
the agency entrusted to it. Since it is the legislature. which delegates 
legislative power to the administration. it is primarily for it to supervise and 
control the actual exercise of this power and ensure against the danger of its 
objectionable. abusive and unwarranted use by the administration.57
The underlying object of legislative control is to keep watch over the 
rulemaking authorities and to provide an opportunity to criticize them if there 
exists an abuse of power on their part. This being the rationale for the 
lawmaking body to exercise its controlling and supervisory function over the 
rulemaking power of administrative authorities. the other equally important 
issue relates to the method and procedure of control.
Administrative rulemaking activities are supervised by the legislative organ 
in two ways. In India. for instance. the legislature can control delegated 
legislation effectively. first. by way of defining the limits of the delegated power 
clearly and precisely. and second. by examining whether they are within the 
limits that have been laid down.58 The first one that operates at the level of 
delegation is a rule of procedure requiring that a bill involving delegation of 
legislative power shall be accompanied by a memorandum explaining such 
proposals and drawing attention to their scope and stating also whether they are 
of exceptional or normal character.59 The other method is called laying on the
14________________Mizan Law Review______________ Vol. 7 No.l. September 2013
57 Jain and Jain. cited in Upadhyaya. J.J.R.. supra note 1. pp. 99.
58 Jayakumar. N.K.. supra note 1. pp.21
59 Lok Sabha Rule 79. Rajya Sabha Rule No. 65.
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table, which is taken as one of the best devises of control. This method serves 
two purposes; first, it informs the legislature as to what rules have been framed 
by the administrative authorities in exercise of lawmaking power, and secondly, 
it provides an opportunity to the legislature to question or challenge the rules 
already made or that are proposed to be made, and such procedure is required to 
be followed in almost all commonwealth countries.60
There are several types in the application of this method, and the degree of 
control necessarily differs in these forms.61 Institutionally, again, the Indian 
system has set up a committee on subordinate legislation in each house of the 
indian parliament, and it pursues the model of the select committee on statutory 
instruments set up by the House of Commons in England in 1946.62 Each 
committee consists of 15 members and the chairman is generally the member of 
the opposition and government ministers are excluded from the membership of 
the committees.63 The main function of such committees on subordinate 
legislation is to scrutinize and report to the House whether the powers to make 
regulations, rules, sub-rules, by-laws,64 etc..., conferred by the constitution or 
delegated by parliament, are being properly exercised within such delegation.65
In performing their function, the committees, inter alia, examine (a) whether 
the delegated legislation is in accord with the general objective of the 
constitution or the parliamentary act pursuant to which it is made; (b) whether it 
contains matters which, in the opinion of the committees, should more properly 
be dealt with in an act of parliament such as levying tax, limiting jurisdiction of 
courts, etc.; (c) whether it appears to make some unusual or unexpected use of 
the powers conferred by the constitution or the parliamentary act pursuant to 
which it is made; and (d) whether for any reason its form or purport call for any 
elucidation.66 Through the years, the works of these committees have been very 
constructive and useful and have won acclaim from many that they are vigorous 
and independent bodies.67
60
61
Upadhyaya, J.J.R., supra note 1, p. 100.
Ibid.
62 Jayakumar, N.K., supra note 1, p. 22.
63 Id, p. 23.
64 A By-Law is a rule of administrative provision, which is adopted by an association or 
corporation for its internal governance and includes all orders, ordinances, 
regulations, rules and statutes made by any authority subordinate to the legislature. 
Aiyar, P.R., (2006), Concise Law Dictionary, Wadhawa, Nagpur, p. 145.
65 Jayakumar, N.K., supra note 1, p. 23.
66 Rule 320, Rules of procedure and conduct of business in the Lok Sabha.
67 Jayakumar, N.K., supra note 1, p. 23.
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4.2 Judicial Control (Review by the Courts)
Courts have a significant role in controlling the rulemaking powers of 
administrative bodies and in examining the validity of the rules because they are 
expected to be guardians of fundamental rights and freedoms. This judicial 
control over delegated legislation is called judicial review. The term ‘judicial 
review’ has different meanings and scope in different jurisdictions. For example, 
in the United States, judicial review refers to “the power of a court to review the 
actions of public sector bodies in terms of their lawfulness, or to review the 
constitutionality of a statute or treaty, or to review an administrative regulation 
for consistency with a statute, a treaty, or the Constitution itself’.68 In the United 
Kingdom, the term judicial review refers to the power of the judiciary to 
supervise the activities of governmental bodies on the basis of rules and 
principles of public law that define the grounds of judicial review. it is 
concerned with the power of judges to check and control the activities and 
decisions of governmental bodies, tribunals, inferior courts etc.69 70
Such an institution controls the scope, necessity and validity of delegated 
legislation by applying two tests, namely: substantive ultra vires, and 
procedural ultra vires10 When a subordinate legislation goes beyond the scope 
of authority conferred on the delegate to enact, it is known as substantive ultra 
vires. It is a fundamental principle of law that a public authority cannot act 
outside the ambit of its powers and if the authority acts, such an act would be 
ultra vires and accordingly void as has been rightly described by scholars to be 
the central principle and foundation of large part of administrative law.71
Procedural ultra vires is committed when a subordinate legislation is enacted 
without complying with the procedural requirements prescribed by the parent 
act (the principal legislation enacted by the parliament). In such cases, the courts 
may or may not quash delegated legislation depending upon whether the 
procedure is held to be mandatory or directory.72 In India and the United States, 
judicial control over delegated legislation through judicial review is exercised 
by applying the doctrine of ultra vires in a number of circumstances. For 
example, this applies “when the parent act or the general law itself is ultra vires
68 <http://www.en.wikpidedia.org/wiki/Judicial_review_inthe_United_States>, 
Accessed on 25th February 2010.
69 D. Longley, and R. James (1999), Administrative Justice: Central issues in UK and 
European Administrative Law, (Cavendish Publishing Limited, UK), p. 105.
70 Ultra Vires (Latin) etymologically means beyond powers. If an act is done by an 
administrative authority in excess of power granted to it, the act is declared to be an 
ultra vires act.
71 Durga Basu quoted in Upadhyaya, J.J.R., supra note 1, p. 87.
72 Upadhyaya, J.J.R., supra note 1, p. 87.
Administrative Rulemaking in Ethiopia: Normative and Institutional Framework 17
the constitution, or when the delegated legislation is ultra vires the constitution 
or when the delegated legislation is ultra vires the parent act”.73
4.3 Control by the Ombudsman
Modern administrative systems have established a control and supervisory 
mechanism by external institutional frameworks such as the Ombudsman, which 
literally refers to the grievance man or a commissioner of the administration.74 
This organ is deemed to be strong enough to prevent injustice to the individual 
while leaving the administration adequate freedom to enable it carry on effective 
government.75 The overall function of an ombudsman is to control and prevent 
maladministration in the government departments and its importance has also 
made it to be internationally acclaimed as one of the National Human Rights 
Institutions (NHRI) recognized by the Paris Principles of 1993.76
The institution of the ombudsman was first recognized and established in 
Sweden which established the institution under its 1809 Constitution. Denmark 
also takes the credit along with sweden. Especially, in 1954, the institution was 
introduced to the world by Denmark’s first chief Ombudsman Prof. Stephen 
Horwitz, who played a vital role in making the institution very popular all over 
the world through his travel to many countries to introduce the significance of 
the institution. In the year 1960, the institution gained wider acceptance in other 
countries. At present, the ombudsman is not only a public entity, but it is also 
being established in the spheres of banking, insurance institutions and 
international/regional organizations. For instance, the Maastricht treaty which 
gave birth to the European Union in 1992 has a provision about the 
establishment of the ombudsman.77
Ombudsman varies from parliamentary and judicial control in three areas. 
First, it is independent and non-partisan which supervises the administration 
(executive). Second, it deals with specific complaints from the public against 
administrative injustice and mal-administration, and third, its power to 
investigate, criticize and report to the legislature is not backed by the power of 
reversing administrative action.78
73 Alan Wharm, “Judicial Control of Delegated Legislation: The test of reasonableness”, 
Madison Law Review Vol. 36, No. 611, 1973. See also Jain, M.P., “Parliamentary 
Control of Delegated Legislation in India”, (1964), Public law Review, Vol. 33, p. 56.
74 Upadhyaya, J.J.R., supra note 1, pp. 381-2.
75 ibid.
76 Principles relating to the status and function of national institutions for the promotion 
and protection of human rights of the UN, G/A Res. A/48/134 of 20 December 1993
77 For an excellent discussion on the historical development of ombudsman, see 
Leyland, P., and Woods, T., supra note 1, 142.
78 Upadhyaya, J.J.R., supra note 1, p. 382.
18 Mizan Law Review Vol. 7 No.1, September 2013
This institution is like a public safety valve against maladministration and it 
is meant to enhance good system of administration. It is thus required to be 
responsible and responsive to the people. Considering its importance, the 
Ethiopian parliament, has in accordance with Art. 55(14)&(15) of the FDRE 
Constitution, established the institution alongside its twin organ, the Human 
Rights Commission in the year 2000.79 The objective of the Ethiopian 
Ombudsman is to bring about good governance, i.e., high quality, transparent 
and efficient administration based on the principle of rule of law that ensures the 
respect of fundamental rights of all citizens by the administration (the 
executive).80 The institution is given specific powers and responsibilities toward 
the achievement of its objectives. It is, inter alia, entrusted with the task of 
supervising administrative directives (administrative rules) issued by executive 
organs and their application so that they do not contravene the constitutional 
rights of citizens and the law.81
5. Administrative Rulemaking in Ethiopia
5.1 A Cursory Look at Previous Constitutions
The 1931 and 1955 constitutions (and the 1974 draft) did not contain any 
meaningful and practical limit on the power of government. The 1931 
Constitution was simply a means of centralizing power of the Emperor, and, as 
Markaris notes, it was “designed as a legal weapon in the process of 
centralization of governmental power”.82 The 1955 Revised Constitution 
showed little improvement in this regard as it tried to define and distribute 
powers of government among the various organs. It also included some 
provisions on fundamental rights and freedoms. But it failed to do away with the 
concentration of power in the hands of the Emperor as he shared lawmaking 
power with parliament. The Emperor also had some judicial powers which were 
stated in the constitution as the power to maintain justice. Moreover, the 
essential executive powers were vested directly on him. Under such 
constitutional set up, mechanisms of executive power control cannot exist 
because it would mean checking the unquestionable power of the Emperor.
79 The Institution of the Ombudsman and the Human rights Commission were 
established on the same day, by successive Proclamation No. 211/2000 and 
proclamation No. 210/2000, respectively. However, both institutions became 
operational five years after their official formation.
80 Article 5 of Proclamation No. 211/2000 (Institution of the Ombudsman Establishment 
Proclamation.)
81 Article 6(1) of Proclamation No. 211/2000
82 H.Scholler (2005), Ethiopian Constitutional and Legal Development, Vol. I (Rudiger 
Koppe Verlag).
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Nevertheless, there were some attempts and signs toward addressing the 
grievances of citizens against maladministration. For instance, there was 
legislative effort to establish the ombudsman during the last days of the 
Emperor’s regime immediately after the upsurge of the 1974 revolution. The 
1974 Draft Constitution devoted its ninth chapter to the establishment of the 
office of the Ombudsman.83 This draft, and thereby the establishment of the 
Ombudsman, remained in paper as a result of the fall of the Emperor in 1974. 
During the same period, an unsuccessful attempt was made to introduce for the 
first time an Administrative procedure Law that was meant to govern the 
decision-making process of administrative agencies. The draft was not actually 
as comprehensive as the American Administrative procedure Act since it failed 
to deal with the rulemaking procedures of the agencies. its scope was limited to 
providing mandatory adjudication procedures of the agencies and the 
establishment of administrative court to review their decision.84
5.2 Current Status of Administrative Rulemaking in 
Ethiopia
The 1995 FDRE Constitution clearly stipulates that the council of ministers, 
which is the highest executive body in the government structure, is authorized, 
not by the Constitution but by the power vested in it by the legislative organ, to 
enact regulations.85 Lawmaking power is the constitutional responsibility of the 
House of Peoples Representatives (HoPR). Nevertheless, some of its lawmaking 
powers are delegated to the Council of Ministers because of the professional 
expertise in the executive and the need for efficient rulemaking regarding 
details. Not only is the executive branch authorized to enact regulations in 
general, but each department of the same branch is also given the power to make 
its own directives within the ambit of its power. unlike the regulations issued by 
the Council of Ministers, which is clearly stated in the Constitution, we see no 
clear constitutional provision as to the delegated lawmaking power of each 
administrative organ of the government. instead, whenever it is necessary to 
establish an administrative organ, the parliament will clearly state that the 
institution has the power of issuing directives, in the constitutive or subsequent 
legislation86 to implement the proclamations and regulations enacted by the 
Parliament and the Council of Ministers respectively.87
83 Art. 143 of the 1974 Draft Constitution.
84 Scholler, supra note 82.
85 Art. 77(13) of the FDRE Constitution of 1995.
86 Legislation enacted by the parliament for the purpose of establishing an institution 
specifies its structure, powers and responsibilities, and is known as enabling 
legislation. Art. 34 of Proclamation No. 691/2010 (Definition of the powers and 
Duties of the Executive Organs of the FDRE) expressly empowers the Council of
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Unfortunately, however, while the legislative process pursued by the 
lawmaking organ used to be governed by a specific law; i.e. Proclamation No. 
271/2002,87 88 this proclamation was repealed and replaced by Proclamation No. 
470/2005.89 Again, this proclamation is no more applicable as it was repealed by 
another third law; i.e. Proclamation No. 503/2006.90 This law not only repeals 
the law governing legislative procedures, but it totally abolishes the existing law 
without providing any substitute. As the preamble clearly indicates, the 
legislative procedure should be governed not by a proclamation to this effect but 
by an internal regulation of the House. As a result, the current law that governs 
the legislative procedure of the House is The House of Peoples' Representatives 
Regulation No. 3/1998.91 This regulation is not officially published and 
accessible to the public since it is an internal rule and procedure issued by the 
House as per Article 59(2) of the FDRE Constitution.92
Ministers to issue regulations for the establishment, reestablishment, dissolution, 
merger or division of any administrative agency in Ethiopia. in effect, the enabling 
act of parliamentary legislation my no longer be relevant and, administrative law in 
Ethiopia has now got a new face due to this provision.
87 Any enabling or substantive proclamation by the parliament contains such a clause. 
See for example, Art. 27(2) of the National Bank Establishment Proclamation (as 
amended), i.e. Proclamation No 591/2008; Art. 59(2) of Banking Business 
Proclamation No 592/2008; Art. 117(2) of Proclamation No. 286/2002 (Income Tax 
Proclamation) that gives the power to issue directives to the Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Development; and Art. 24 (2) of the Disclosure and Registration of Assets 
Proclamation No. 668/2010 that authorizes the Federal Ethics and Anti-Corruption 
Commission to issue directives necessary to implement the proclamation.
88 House of Peoples Representatives Legislative Procedure, Committees Structure and 
Working Proclamation No. 271/2002.
89 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia House of Peoples’ Representatives Working 
Procedure and Members’ Code of Conduct (Amendment) Proclamation No.
470/2005.
90 The Proclamation to Repeal the Amended Proclamation of the House of Peoples’ 
Representatives Working Procedure and Members’ Code of Conduct 
Proclamation No. 503/2006.
91 The House of Peoples' Representatives of The Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia Rules of Procedures and Members' Code of Conduct Regulation No. 3/1998.
92 This regulation also controls the lawmaking process of administrative agencies by the 
parliament. Even in the absence of clear provisions of laying procedure and 
committee arrangement to supervise delegated legislation, the parliament could use 
Articles 55(17)&(19) of the FDRE Constitution together with Art. 155(1)(a) of 
Regulation No. 3/1998 (The House of Peoples' Representatives of The Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Rules of Procedures and Members' Code of 
Conduct Regulation).
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With regard to administrative organs, the Council of Ministers has issued an 
internal rule governing the working procedures of the council of ministers.93 
Article 48 of the rule specifically deals with the process of preparing 
regulations. However, no formal legal rule is officially proclaimed/ published as 
to how each administrative agency, in particular, and the higher executive organ 
(the Council of Ministers), in general, should exercise delegated law-making 
power.
The notable exception in this apparent dearth of administrative procedural 
rules with regard to administrative legislation is Proclamation No. 590/2008 
(Freedom of the Mass-Media and Access to Information Proclamation) which 
requires a public body to publish “the description of its regulations, directives, 
policies, guidelines and manuals which govern the operation and activities of its 
various organs along with the description of amendments or repeal of such 
provisions.” This obviously helps in guaranteeing better access to the 
administrative rules once they are adopted.
However, there is ambiguity in the meaning of the requirement of 
publication, because it is not clear whether it refers to (a) publication in the 
official gazette as required by the Negarit Gazette Establishment Proclamation, 
(Proclamation No. 3-1995), or (b) publication in the government-owned 
newspapers such as Addis Zemen, or (c) whether mere duplication of the rules 
in many copies and making them available to ‘clients’ can be regarded as 
adequate.
5.3 Status of Administrative Directives as ‘Law’, and the 
Requirement of Their Publication
Article 2(2) of the Federal Negarit Gazzete Establishment Proclamation No. 
3/1995 stipulates that all laws of the federal government shall be published in 
the Negarit Gazzete. [Emphasis added]. But the proclamation is silent as to what 
constitutes ‘law’. This, in its turn, will bring the issue of hierarchy of laws and 
the meaning of law under the Ethiopian legal system. Considering the 
arrangement and hierarchy of laws in Ethiopia, the Constitution is the supreme 
law. Next to it, we have parent legislation; i.e. parliamentary proclamations. 
They are primary legislation as they are promulgated by the direct 
representatives of the people. We also have subordinate/secondary/delegated 
legislation. These include administrative laws such as regulations of the Council 
of Ministers and directives issued by administrative agencies in the civil service.
The fundamental question that arises at this juncture is whether the term 
‘law’ includes all these three categories of laws; i.e. proclamations, regulations 
and directives, or whether it only refers to primary legislation. This issue has
93 Decision of the Council of Ministers of October 13, 2003.
been addressed differently by different laws.94 But considering the hierarchy of 
laws and international experience, the term ‘law’ should include the three types 
of laws namely proclamations, regulations and directives as they are applicable 
on all subject matters they are meant to regulate and govern. Therefore, the 
definition of law provided by Article 2(2) Proclamation No. 251/200195 seems 
to be more appropriate than the others. It defines law as “Proclamations issued 
by the Federal or State legislative organs, and regulations and directives issued 
by the Federal and States government institutions and it shall also include 
international agreements that have been ratified By Ethiopia”.
There have been three instances of publication of directives. The first is the 
directives issued for the determination of standard and according to Article 
13(2) of Proclamation No. 49/1996 [Telecommunication Proclamation]96 the 
directives were envisaged to be published based on the directions of the 
[Telecommunications] Agency. The second is Article 6(6) of Regulation No. 
194/2010 (National Metrology Institute Establishment Council of Ministers 
Regulation) with regard to the duty of Ethiopian National Metrology Institute to 
publish and declare to the public measurement units to be used in the country, 
symbols of the measurement units and national measurement etalons. The third 
bears the name ‘regulation’ but was actually a directive. It was issued by the 
National Electoral Board, signed by the then chairman of the board, and 
published in the Negarit Gazetta.97
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94 For example, Proclamation No.211/2000 defines law as “the Constitution of the 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, the Constitution of a Region as well as 
federal or regional laws and regulations”. According to Proclamation No 251/2001, 
law shall mean “Proclamations issued by the Federal or State legislative organs, and 
regulations and directives issued by the Federal and States government institutions 
and it shall also include international agreements that have been ratified By 
Ethiopia”. As per Proclamation No 250/2001, law shall mean “the proclamations and 
Regulations issued by the Federal Government or the states as well as international 
agreements which Ethiopia has endorsed and accepted”; and Proclamation No. 
25/1996 defines law as “all previous laws in force which are not inconsistent with the 
Constitution and relating to matters that fall within the competence of the Federal 
Government as specified in the Constitution.”
95 A Proclamation to Consolidate the House of the Federation of FDRE and to Define its 
Powers and Responsibilities, Proclamation No. 251/2001
96 Please note that some provisions (Arts. 3-9) of this Proclamation are now repealed. 
The rights and obligations of the Telecommunication Agency are now transferred to 
the newly established Ministry of Communication and Information Technology 
pursuant to Arts. 35(1)/d/ and 36(5) of Proclamation No. 691/2010 (Proclamation to 
Provide for the Definition of Powers and Duties of the Executive Organs of FDRE).
97 National Electoral Board of Ethiopia Regulations No. 2/1999 (Determination of the 
Procedure for Expression by the Electorate of the Loss of Mandate of Deputies 
National Electoral Board Regulation).
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With regard to the binding effect of unpublished administrative directives, 
the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division opined that although subsidiary 
legislation especially administrative directives are not published officially or 
written in foreign language, they are still binding since there is no mandatory 
legal requirement so far regarding their publication and it held that lack of 
publication shall not affect the binding effect of such directives.98 The court 
could have, however, considered the fact that directives fall under the term 
“law” as stipulated under Article 2(2) of Proclamation No. 251/2001 and that all 
laws should be published as required under Article 2(2) of proclamation No. 
3/1995 (Federal Negarit Gazetta Establishment Proclamation).
In another case, the Federal Supreme Court Cassation Division99 held that 
courts are required to take judicial notice of all laws including administrative 
directives since they are officially issued by the government. Here, the Court 
assumed that the mere issuance of the directives renders them ‘official’ as a 
result of which, the Cassation Division required courts to take judicial notice of 
such directives thereby disregarding the most important precondition of judicial 
notice; i.e. publication.
Another issue that substantiates the necessity of publishing directives relates 
to their effective date. Some directives issued by government agencies do not 
clearly indicate their specific effective date as a result of which, it is impossible 
to distinguish between the draft and the final directive.100 In some agencies, the 
date of the signature by the head of the issuing authority is taken as the effective 
date of the directives, which seems to be the practice in the directives of 
Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority. There are also agencies which 
expressly provide for the exact effective date of a directive.101
5.4 Ambiguity, Language and the Processes of Issuance
The absence of publication, public participation and notice in administrative 
rulemaking gives rise to serious problems. Such problems include vague 
delegation, approval procedures, language accessibility and the parliamentary
98 Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority vs. DanielMekonnen, FSC Cassation 
Division File No. 43781, Hamle 14, 2002 E.C (i.e. July 21, 2010).
99 Dandi Boru University College vs. Teklu Urga E. et al. FSC Cassation Division File 
No. 40804, Tir 26, 2001 E.C (i.e. February 3, 2009)
100 An example in this regard is the Directive sent to Educational institutions with 
regard to the worship practice in educational institutions of Hidar 2000 E.C. 
(November 2007) , containing no effective date, no signature or no seal of the 
Ministry.
101 For instance, see directives issued by the Charities and Societies Agency, directives 
of Ethiopian Broadcasting Authority, directives of National Electoral Board and 
directives of the National Bank of Ethiopia.
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controlling system. Few statues require a directive to be approved by an internal 
higher authority such as a council or a board.102 There is also lack of clarity in 
the manner of delegation and approval procedure of directives. in some 
instances it is not clear whether the specific agency is vested with the power of 
issuing the respective directive.
Moreover, there is a requirement of approval by “the government”. The word 
‘government’ is a general expression which lacks specificity whether it refers to 
the prime minister, the council of ministries, or the relevant ministry. The 
following illustrates this vague expression:103
“... employ and administer the employees of the agency/authority in 
accordance with the directives approved by the government following the 
basic principles of the federal civil service laws.”
The other central problem is the issue of language. Almost all directives 
especially those affecting foreign investors and companies are prepared in 
Amharic. Almost all the directives of the Ethiopian Revenue and Customs 
Authority and the Ethiopian investment Agency that affect the business 
undertakings of foreign investors are prepared only in Amharic. Few agencies 
like the National Bank of Ethiopia prepare their directive in English, and some 
other directives are prepared in both Amharic and English languages.104
There is no doubt that administrative rules (in the form of regulations of 
Council of Ministers or Administrative directives) are as important as the 
principal legislation (parliamentary proclamations) because they are issued to 
implement parliamentary laws. However, the process of their issuance, as stated 
above, is not uniform and this is bound to continue as long as their legislative 
process is not transparent and regulated by law and procedures. The current 
process not only creates confusion and inconsistent standards, but will also 
encroach upon the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals. it also 
contravenes the FDRE Constitution with the risk of destroying the stability of
102 See Proclamation No. 720/2011 (the Ethiopian Federal Police Commission 
Establishment Proclamation), Proclamation No. 692/2010 (Federal Sport’s 
Commission Establishment Proclamation), Proclamation No. 674/2010 (Pesticide 
Registration and Control Proclamation), Proclamation No. 571/2008 (Radiation 
Protection Proclamation) and Proclamation No. 495/2006 (Social Security Agency 
Reestablishment Proclamation).
103 See for instance the Broadcasting Service Proclamation No. 533/2007; the Ethiopian 
Commodity Exchange Authority Establishment Proclamation (Amendment) No. 
566/2008, National Educational Assessment and Examination Agency Establishment 
Regulation No. 260/2012; Catering and Tourism Center Establishment Regulation 
No. 174/2009; Civil Aviation Proclamation No. 616/2008.
104 The directives of the Ethiopian Electoral Board, Ethiopian Environmental Authority, 
and the former Ethiopian Telecommunication Agency.
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the constitutional system in general. The administrative rules briefly discussed 
in following section illustrate this point.
5.5 Samples in Arbitrary Rulemaking
5.5.1 Abrogation of an employee’s right to appeal against dismissal
Following the restructuring of the executive organs of the Ethiopian government 
by Proclamation No. 471/2005, the former Ministry of Revenue has been 
reduced to the level of an Authority and re-named as the Ethiopian Revenues 
and Customs Authority (ERCA). The minister was re-assigned as Director 
General of the Authority. Based on this, the specific powers and responsibilities 
and other detailed matters concerning the Authority were addressed by another 
proclamation; i.e. Proclamation No. 587/2008.105 Pursuant to this law, the 
Council of Ministers was authorized to issue regulations; and it issued Council 
of Ministers Regulation No. 155/2008 on the administration of the Authority’s 
employees.106
Disciplinary matters of any employee are governed by Articles 34 and 
Article 35 of the Regulation, and there are prescribed procedures to be 
employed before rendering a decision on the employees of the authority.107 If an 
employee of the authority is suspected of corruption by the Director General of 
the Authority, the latter can dismiss the employee without the need of going 
through the whole procedure of taking disciplinary measures, and what makes it 
worse is that an employee, dismissed under these circumstances, has no right to 
be reinstated by any judicial decision.108
The Regulation clearly contravenes the 1995 FDRE Constitution for three 
reasons. First, it clearly violates the constitutional rights of access to justice 
enshrined under Art. 37 of the FDRE Constitution. Regular courts are said to be
105 Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority Establishment Proclamation No. 
587/2008.
106 This is a clear departure from the Federal Civil Service Proclamation No. 515/2007 
that employees of the Authority are now treated differently in every aspect though 
they are still civil servants. Please also note that such a special treatment (positive 
and negative) is given by a regulation, which is lower than a proclamation in the 
hierarchy of laws.
107 These provisions and the procedures incorporated in the new Civil Service 
Proclamation; i.e. Proclamation No. 515/2007 fail to clearly state and guarantee the 
constitutional rights of employees to be heard (fair hearing); Compare Art. 69 of 
Proclamation No. 515/2006 and Art. 34 Regulation No. 155/2008 with the previous 
Federal Civil Servants proclamation No. 262/2002, Art. 67(2).
108 Art. 37 of Regulation No. 155/2008.
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guardians of rights and freedoms, and unless individuals are guaranteed and 
guarded by such courts, such rights become superfluous and nominal.
Second, judicial independence, a fundamental constitutional principle, is 
violated because the Regulation takes away the power of the courts and confers 
it to an administrative entity. This violates Article 78(4) of the Constitution 
which provides that “special or ad hoc courts will never be established that will 
take judicial powers away from the courts or institutions legally empowered to 
exercise judicial functions and do not follow the prescribed procedure”. 
However, the authority under consideration is not an institution legally 
empowered to exercise judicial functions. Nor did it follow legally prescribed 
procedures.
Thirdly, such rules clearly violate a fundamental principle of administrative 
law known as “Nemo Judex in Causa Sua” (in Latin), which means that “no one 
should be made a judge in his/her own case.” The Ethiopian Revenues and 
Customs Authority, by enjoying such a power, clearly takes the law in its own 
hands thereby acting in dual capacitates as the plaintiff and the judge in its own 
case at the same time. Moreover, It is to be noted that an employee who is 
dismissed on the basis of Regulation No. 155/2008 automatically loses his/her 
social security, which entails the failure of the government to fulfill its 
constitutional obligation to promote the health, welfare, living standards and 
social security109 of such citizens.
One may argue that administrative agencies should, as of necessity, have 
adjudicative power. However, such function is entrusted in administrative 
organs by at the same time putting in place a setting in which the functional 
independence of the administrative entity entrusted with the adjudicative task is 
assured. Council of Ministers Regulation No. 155/2008 thus violates due 
process of law which requires any measure or government decision to be in 
accordance with the prescribed procedures of the positive laws in the absence of 
which arbitrariness will reign.
5.5.2 Banned enrolment to private HEIs in the fields of law and teacher 
education
The August 2010 Directive of the Ministry of Education has banned the 
enrollment of new students to private higher education institutions (HEis) in the 
fields of law and teacher education. The Directive states the reasons why it 
suspends some other educational sectors like Distance education (a measure that
109 Art. 89(8) and Art. 90(1) of the FDRE Constitution. Based on such regulation, i.e. 
Council of Ministers Regulation No. 155/2007, the Director General of the Ethiopian 
Revenue and Customs Authority (ERCA) has dismissed 49 employees suspected of 
corruption during the first quarter of the 2003 E.C fiscal year. (Addis Zemen 
Newspaper 70th year No. 83, Hidar 23/2003 (December 2, 2010), pp. 1 & 12.
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has been lifted in due course), the opening or expanding of new branches and 
new fields of studies etc. However, it does not state the reason/s why student 
enrollment in law and teacher education is banned.110
If the title of the Directive that reads the ‘Directive Issued to Ensure the 
Quality and Relevance of Higher Education and TVET’, implies inferior quality 
of private higher educational institutions in the legal and teachers’ education 
streams, there should have been a distinction among private Higher Education 
institutions which offer law and teacher education programs. Moreover, law and 
teacher education programs of some public universities should have been 
banned or suspended.
There is also the query as to why law and teacher education are singled out, 
while medicine is pertinent to the life of citizens, and engineering constitutes 
one of the pillars for every aspect of Ethiopia’s developmental pursuits. As 
quality cannot be sectoral based on private/public dichotomy, any measure of 
banning or suspension should not have been based on a public/private divide, 
but on the basis of the quality audits of HERQA (Higher Education and 
Relevance Quality Agency). Moreover, such the ban or suspension should have 
applied to both public and private higher education institutions in professions 
such as medicine, engineering, law, teacher education, and others as well.
Graduates from all sectors (whether public or private) serve the same public 
upon graduation, and such measures should not have taken ‘ownership’ models 
of the institutions as yardsticks, but should have rather been based on the quality 
and standards of educational service delivery. if the directive had a counterpart 
in USA, law schools such as Harvard and Yale would have been banned.
Article 25 the FDRE Constitution clearly states that all persons are equal 
before the eyes of the law, and these persons111 are entitled to equal protection 
of the law without any discrimination of any kind. Thus all organs of the 
government (the legislative, executive and judiciary) both at the federal and 
state levels have the constitutional duty and responsibility to respect and enforce 
this constitutional provision.112 On the contrary, the Ministry of Education has 
violated this constitutional right of citizens by issuing such a discriminatory 
directive. Had there been an administrative rule making procedure, such a 
directive would not have been issued or could have been promptly reviewed by 
the relevant organs.
110 Sec. 2(5) and Sec. 3(3) of the directive.
111 Private higher educational institutions are legal persons before the law.
112 Art. 13(1) of the FDRE Constitution reads: “All Federal and State Legislative, 
Executive and Judicial organs at all levels shall have the responsibility and duty to 
respect and enforce the provisions of this chapter”, i.e., the third chapter that 
embodies Articles 13 to 44 which address fundamental human and democratic 
rights. Article 25 is one of these constitutional provisions under the third chapter.
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Concluding Remarks
Administrative agencies are susceptible to abuse of authority in relation to the 
purse and the gun under their control. Schemes of balance, check and control 
are thus very essential over these agencies including clear procedures which 
should harness administrative rules, directives and their implementation. in the 
absence of such clear and strict procedures, substantive rights and freedoms of 
citizens are vulnerable to series of infringements.
These procedural rules of administrative legislation have a dual purpose: 
first, they prevent the issuance of administrative directives that may encroach 
upon the fundamental rights and freedoms. Second, they help the government to 
check itself and correct any mistake and mitigate incidences of administrative 
abuse. Administrative agencies erode their democratic legitimacy and can be 
susceptible to substantive and procedural abuse of power unless their 
rulemaking functions are harnessed by publicity of the draft rules before 
issuance, participation of stakeholders in public discussion about the draft 
administrative rules, publication of the rules, parliamentary control and judicial 
review.
in light of the Ethiopian current situation, the expedience of administrative 
rules is apparent. This is indeed compounded by the increasing role of the 
Ethiopian government as a result of the ‘developmental state’ theory it has 
pledged to pursue because such pursuits significantly enhance the role of the 
state in the economic and social sectors. ______ ■
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